The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, I investigate whether numerous debt initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s have had a significant effect on economic growth rates in developing countries in general. The major initiatives during that time period were negotiated as bilateral agreements under the guidance of the Paris Club of Creditors. These agreements were complemented later on by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative in 1996 and its "enhanced" version in 1999. I find that, on average, debt relief has no effect on growth rates of developing countries. The second question I address in this paper is whether the effect on growth rates was different for different subsets of developing countries. I find that countries that are not classified as HIPC have benefited significantly from debt relief, whereas the growth rates of HIPC countries have been unaffected.
argue that in this situation the high stock of debt acts like a high marginal tax on investment. They suggest that the incentives for domestic firms or the debtor government to invest at home are distorted since any positive returns from investment projects are used for debt payments. Anticipating this, however, economically sensible investment projects will be forgone, thus harming the long-term economic growth rate of the debtor country.
Conceptually this idea is incorporated into the debt Laffer curve, which is represented by an "inverted U" relationship between the level of debt stock and expected net present value (NPV) of debt service payments. Debt overhang in this context means that a country is to the right of the peak of this curve. In this scenario, a decrease in debt stock (through debt relief) increases the expected NPV of repayments. Hence, from a creditor country's perspective, this theory provides an economic rationale for debt relief if the debtor suffers from debt overhang. 8 In an empirical study, Pattillo et al. (2002) find evidence of debt overhang. Using a panel data set comprised of 93 developing countries for the period 1969-1998, they suggest that at a debt stock of 35-40 percent of GDP, the average effect of debt on per capita growth becomes negative. Clements et al. (2003) confirm their results of a debt overhang. Furthermore, they find that debt service has a "crowding out" effect on public investment, thereby lowering the overall growth rate of a developing country. They argue that if resources freed up by debt service relief can be directed towards public investment, growth rates in some HIPC countries would increase by half a percentage point annually. Similarly, Chowdhury (2001) finds evidence for debt overhang in his sample. He uses extreme bounds analysis to compare HIPC countries with other moderately to severely indebted countries.
The main focus of his paper is whether the set of countries eligible for HIPC debt relief should be extended. He finds that debt stock and debt service have a negative effect on growth rates in both country groups; this suggests that debt overhang is present and that debt relief could potentially have beneficial consequences for countries currently excluded from the HIPC initiative.
However, there is disagreement about the existence or importance of debt overhang and the debt Laffer curve. For example, Bird and Milne (2003) question the presence of a debt overhang problem in low-income countries. Official resource transfers to highly indebted countries often exceed their debt service payments. Hence, incentives for domestic investment may not be distorted after all. Furthermore, they caution that providing (unconditional) debt relief to highly indebted countries may simply redistribute resources to countries with a history of unsound macroeconomic policies. Hence, "bad policies" in the past would be rewarded ex-post by providing debt relief. In the theoretical literature, there are several papers questioning the conventionally held view that an excessive level of sovereign debt has distortionary incentive effects on the behavior of economic agents in the indebted country [Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989) , Cordella et al. (2002) , Kletzer and Wright (2000) ]. For example, Kletzer and Wright (2000) make the point that a renegotiation proof constrained efficient perfect equilibrium implies irrelevance of debt overhang. Debt up to a country's maximum "willingness to pay" is relevant; however, debt beyond that point, i.e., the classical debt overhang, is irrelevant. An important point directly relevant for this paper is made by Cordella et al. (2002) . In contrast to the conventional theoretical literature, where only the present value of debt (stock) matters, the authors argue that only debt service matters.
In their model, debt service relief can raise welfare whereas debt stock does not.
Another (altruistic) rationale for debt relief -particularly in the context of the HIPC debt initiative -is to provide a debtor country with additional resources for poverty reduction.
Funds otherwise used for debt service payments are "freed up" by providing debt relief and can then be used for education or public health expenditures. A concern that naturally arises in this context is aid fungibility, i.e., are the resources freed by debt relief (which may be considered as an indirect form of aid) used as intended by the creditor/donor. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, however. Let me now turn to the empirical model used in the present analysis of the relationship between debt relief, aid, and growth.
Empirical Model
Before going into details about the setup of my regression analysis, let me give a brief overview of the issues addressed in the empirical exercise. The main question being addressed in this empirical analysis is whether debt relief measures in the last two decades positively influenced growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. First, I
investigate the impact of debt relief on growth rates for low-income and lower and upper middle-income countries. Second, I divide the sample into two groups: The first group includes only countries classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries; the second group consists of the remaining developing countries in the sample. As we saw in the previous section, there are numerous studies investigating the link between aid, policies, and growth rates. This study is -to the best of my knowledge -the first one that incorporates debt relief into the aid effectiveness framework and explicitly compares HIPC and non-HIPC countries in terms of aid and debt relief effectiveness. Essential to this empirical analysis is the definition of the debt relief variable(s). I use two different sets of variables to represent debt relief. The debt relief variables -derived from World Bank data -are called debt service relief and debt stock relief. The alternative definition of debt relief (OECD debt relief ) used in the analysis -derived from the OECD's International Development Statistics data set -is somewhat problematic due to different reporting practices among creditor countries.
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Neither alternative precisely captures the definition of debt relief in the theoretical literature, 9 A more detailed description and discussion of the debt relief variables can be found in the next section.
where debt (stock or service) relief is defined as the change in net present value of debt (stock or service, respectively). However, the variables derived from World Bank data come closer to the theoretical measure(s) and are therefore preferred.
To empirically address debt relief and aid effectiveness with respect to growth, I use a specification that is fairly standard in the literature: In addition to debt relief, the other variables of interest included in the regression have previously been used in the literature. Like debt relief, foreign aid is assumed to be growth enhancing by providing additional resources for public investments that would otherwise not be undertaken due to a lack thereof. The squared aid term is included to control for diminishing returns to aid. As previously mentioned, diminishing returns can be a consequence of aid dependence, i.e., a government may relax its efforts for revenue collection in the presence of persistent and large aid inflows. Debt stock and debt serviceat least when they are at very high levels -may hinder growth by distorting private and public investment. The policy term in the interacted aid-policy terms is similar to Burnside and Dollar (2000) . Unlike in BD and some other papers, the policy term is constructed as an equally weighted average of the inflation rate, the budget balance, and of trade openness which is measured as exports as a percentage of GDP. 10 The coefficient estimates for the interacted aid-policy terms tell us whether aid is more effect in a good policy environmentthe main result of BD. 
Data
The entire sample contains data on 122 developing countries that are classified as lowincome, lower middle-income, and upper middle-income countries for the time period 1970-2001. As mentioned previously, to address the question of whether there are different effects of debt relief on different country groups, the entire sample will also be divided into two groups: 39 HIPC countries, and 83 Non-HIPC countries.
Since my main interest lies in the effect of debt relief on growth rates, a clear description of my debt relief variable(s) is necessary. Two alternative approaches are taken. In one approach, I use debt relief variables derived or taken from the Global Development Finance (GDF) 2005 data set. The first variable I take from the data is called debt stock relief. 11 A potential economic effect of debt stock relief will be on perceptions of the future. In the presence of debt overhang, economically meaningful debt stock relief will bring a debtor country back to a sustainable growth path; or in other words, it will remove the disincentives for investment created by the debt overhang. Economic agents will increase their investments in the debtor country and therefore increase economic growth, since they are confident that their return on the investment will not be entirely taxed away to service government debt. Focusing on a different aspect of high indebtedness, namely the debt service burden, I derive a second variable from the GDF 2005 data set by adding the variables principal forgiven and interest forgiven and call it debt service relief. 12 Especially in developing countries, debt service can act as a "burden" in the sense of using government revenue for debt repayment rather than for necessary investments in infrastructure, basic education, health care, water and sanitation, to name just a few. For example, one of the main ideas behind the HIPC initiative -additionality -is addressing exactly this issue. A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) put together by the debtor government specifies exactly how resources that are 'freed up' by the HIPC initiative are to be used for investments in the sectors described above. Debt service relief should therefore positively affect the growth rate: Directly by increasing public investment activity, and indirectly by increasing human capital (at least in the long term).
In the second approach, I use an alternative measure called OECD debt relief taken from the OECD International Development Statistics 2004 data set. 13 As has been pointed out by Powell (2003) , this debt relief variable is not ideal, however. It is reported to the OECD by the creditor countries as their 'cost' of providing debt relief. The main problem is that reporting practices among donors differ significantly. OECD DAC guidelines allow members to choose between two options for reporting debt cancellation: The first option is to report the commitment and disbursement cancelled in a lump sum; or -as a second option -to report the commitment in a lump sum and the disbursements year-by-year, i.e. in the year in which payments would have fallen due. Most donors report the total amount of debt relief granted in the year the agreement is reached. A few countries spread the cost of debt relief over the lifetime of the loan, instead. 14 The OECD variable may therefore be more appropriate in investigating long-term effects on growth. Also, the data cannot be 
Empirical Analysis
In this section I briefly comment on the descriptive statistics reported in tables 1a and 1b.
Furthermore, I describe and interpret the results of the regression analysis. In particular, I
focus on the main question of interest here: Has debt relief had a positive effect on the GDP growth rates of developing countries? The regression results are reported in tables 2a to 3c.
Descriptive Statistics
We will first focus on the descriptive statistics reported in tables 1a and 1b for HIPC and non-HIPC countries, respectively, to get a better idea about the differences between HIPC and non-HIPC countries, . The data covers the time period 1984 to 2001. It is obvious from a casual comparison that similarities are rare and differences quite stark. Starting with gross domestic product, we see that HIPC countries have very low average income levels (about 380 dollar per capita) compared to non-HIPC countries (about 2,500 dollar per capita). The same is true for average per capita growth rates. We see that HIPC countries grew much slower in the sample period, 0.5 vs. 2.4 percent annual growth. As we would expect, the average debt stock for HIPCs was twice as high (with a maximum level of about 740 percent of GDP for Nicaragua in 1995, compared to about 230 percent for Jordan in the same year).
Somewhat surprisingly, the debt service burden is very similar for the two sets of countries as a percentage of GDP. This gives little support to the argument that debt service is a major inhibitor of social expenditure in HIPC countries. A point that has also been noted in earlier studies is the very significant amount of aid received by HIPCs: more than 10 percent of GDP! In line with our expectations, HIPCs received significantly more debt relief (independent of which measure we focus on). A very interesting observation about the components of the policy variable -budget balance, inflation, and trade openness -is that HIPC and non-HIPCs differ significantly only with respect to their trade openness with non-HIPCs having much greater export volumes. Financial depth as proxied by M2 is significantly higher in non-HIPCs, which are also more ethnically diverse and have less area in the tropics.
Measuring Debt Relief with Data from the World Bank
Before discussing the empirical results, let me mention that all the panel data sets that follow are unbalanced due to sometimes severe limitations on data availability. Many studies in the aid effectiveness literature have tried to fill gaps in the data by extrapolation, averaging, etc.; my preferred strategy, however, is to work with an unbalanced panel data since the estimation methods used work also for unbalanced panels. and debt service do not significantly influence growth rates when using the undivided sample.
Of the other main variables of interest, only debt service has a fairly robust negative effect on growth across specifications, particularly when we control for diminishing returns to aid by including the squared aid term. A one percent increase in debt service leads to a drop in the average annual per capita growth rate of GDP of 0.19 to 0.26 percent depending on the specification. In other words, debt service does indeed act as a burden and lowers the growth rate possibly by crowding out public investments. The debt stock only shows a highly significant effect in the OLS fixed effects regressions, which may be biased, however, due to unaccounted for endogeneity of aid and policies. However, the estimates in the other specifications do have the expected negative sign. The policy variable is positive and significant at the one percent level across all specifications, implying that good policies lead to higher growth rates. However, in contrast to Burnside and Dollar (2000) , but in line with some subsequent studies, my results indicate, that aid effectiveness is independent of the policy environment, particularly when I control for diminishing returns of aid [columns (4) to (6) influence on the growth rate of the economy in any specification. Among the control variables, the coefficient on political stability is significantly positive in the OLS fixed effects and Arellano-Bond regressions. This is expected as a higher indicator for political stability implies more stability, which then leads to a higher growth rate of the economy. The coefficient of the lagged level of GDP is negative as expected, suggesting conditional convergence of growth rates. The coefficient estimate of institutional quality is insignificant, which can mean one of two things. Either we have already controlled for the most important factors determining institutional quality and hence, institutional quality may still matter; or -the more straightforward, but less convincing conclusion -that institutional quality doesn't matter. Lastly, less democratic countries -indicated by a higher index number of restrictions on freedom, grow somewhat slower, but the result is not robust.
As pointed out earlier, the differences in economic indicators between HIPC and non-HIPC countries are fairly substantial. We will see that this is also reflected in the significant differences of my regression results. Turning our attention to HIPC countries first [table 2b ], a fairly bleak picture emerges particularly with respect to the effectiveness of debt relief initiatives in promoting growth in the last decade. Neither debt service nor debt stock relief has any significant effect on growth rates in this sub-sample of countries. This is disappointing from a political perspective since many of the initiatives in the 1990s have focused on these very indebted and poor countries. Furthermore, neither the aid terms nor the interacted aid terms are statistically significantly different from zero irrespective of estimation method or specification. Policies by themselves also do not seem to matter, either. When comparing the results on debt service with those for the whole sample, coefficient estimates turn out to be in the same ballpark, but significance is much less robust for HIPC countries. In fact, only when using the system GMM approach, significant estimates result. Among the control variables, the coefficient estimates for restrictions of freedom and for political stability have the correct signs are at least weakly significant for most specifications. Even growth rates do not seem to converge for HIPC country data. Overall, these results beg the question: What are the determinants on growth in heavily indebted poor countries? Future research will have to address this question.
Finally, the focus turns to countries that are not classified as HIPC. Table 2c reports the results of the empirical analysis. Given the extent of debt relief provided to HIPC countries compared to non-HIPCs, it is quite surprising to see that debt service relief effectively improved growth rates in non-HIPC countries. This may indicate that the additional resources were used for socially worthwhile investments rather than being diverted to consumption expenditure. A one percent increase in debt service relief leads to a 0.2 % increase in the GDP growth rate in the specification including a squared aid term [columns (4)- (6)].
Hence, non-HIPC countries have benefited unambiguously in terms of higher growth from debt relief and rescheduling initiatives in the 1990s. Debt stock relief, on the other hand, had no statistically significant effect on growth. These results lend support to Cordella et al.
(2002) who suggest that only debt service relief matters, whereas debt stock relief is irrelevant.
Increasing debt stock and debt service both lower economic growth -with debt service having a bigger effect; the coefficient estimates are highly significant. A one percent increase in debt service leads to a 0.4 percent drop in growth, while a one percent increase in debt stock reduces growth by "only" 0.025 to 0.090 percent. For non-HIPC countries, policy matters.
Good policy by itself increases growth as well as enhancing aid effectiveness, thus lending some support to the BD results. The coefficient estimates for policy are robust and highly significant independent of estimation method and specification. Aid by itself, however, does not seem to be beneficial in terms of growth; if anything, aid seems to have a detrimental effect on growth rates. One possible explanation could be that increased aid inflows are interpreted as a negative signal by private investors, who then decrease their investments while public investments are not able to compensate for the decline completely. The coefficient estimates for lagged GDP per capita provide empirical support for the conditional convergence hypothesis of growth rates among non-HIPC countries. Finally, financial depth has a fairly robust positive influence on growth rates.
Measuring Debt Relief with Data from the OECD
In this sub-section, I report and discuss the empirical results of the regression specifications using debt relief data from the OECD. As discussed in section 4, this measure of debt relief is somewhat problematic because of differing reporting practices by creditor countries.
Furthermore, there is no distinction between debt service and debt stock relief. The measure appears to be closer to debt stock than debt service relief, though. Notes: * = in % of GDP. Trade openness is measured as "exports as a percentage of GDP". Ethnolinguistic Heterogeneity is the probability that two people in a country picked at random belong to the same ethnic group. Financial Depth is measured as M2/GDP. Notes: * = in % of GDP. Trade openness is measured as "exports as a percentage of GDP". Ethnolinguistic Heterogeneity is the probability that two people in a country picked at random belong to the same ethnic group. Financial Depth is measured as M2/GDP. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP. All regressions include year dummies and a constant term. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All debt and all aid terms are expressed in percent of gross domestic product. Financial depth is defined as M2/GDP. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. In the GMM regressions, policy , aid , and aid squared are instrumented with 10 lags of their own levels, and additionally with 10 lags of their first-differences in (3) and (6). Additionally, aid is instrumented by the natural logarithm of population.
